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T

he parameters of the discussion about nuclear weapons are well
known and appear to be relatively fixed. It seems as if there has
been little new on that front in forty years. Most civilian scholars
have lost interest in nuclear weapons and moved on to other topics. But
it is the habit of the military mind to learn from the past; even today
there are lessons to be learned from Cannae, Waterloo, and Vicksburg.
It will not surprise thoughtful military officers to find that the past has
something important and interesting to tell us about nuclear weapons.
The conventional wisdom is that nuclear weapons are horrible,
probably immoral, but necessary. We keep them because they have a
unique ability to coerce and deter. There are psychological characteristics to the weapons—as Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out in
the first semiofficial discussion of them in 1947—that make them unlike
other weapons.1
Now new evidence is throwing doubt on these decades-old conclusions. Actually not “new” evidence, but additional evidence culled from
a careful study of the past.

Hiroshima

The first and most important revision to history has to do with
the efficacy of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki.2 This new evidence,
however, has nothing to do with the “revisionist” school of Hiroshima
history. The revisionist school ascended in 1964 with the publication
by Gar Alperovitz of a book arguing that bombing Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was unnecessary—the Japanese would have surrendered
anyway.3 This debate has caused controversy and aroused passions for
almost fifty years. But it is not really about nuclear weapons. The revisionists argue that the bombings were horrible and, since they weren’t
necessary to win the war, they were immoral. The counterrevisionists
argue that the bombings were required and were, therefore, moral. But
this is a debate about whether the United States acted morally, not about
whether nuclear weapons work. New evidence seems to suggest that
while the bombs destroyed the cities, they didn’t play much of a role (or
perhaps any) in convincing Japan’s leaders to surrender.
1     Henry L. Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Harper’s Magazine, 194/1161
(1947): 97-107.
2     See chapter one of Ward Wilson, Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons (New York: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2013) and Ward Wilson, “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in
Light of Hiroshima,” International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 162-179.
3     Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the
American Confrontation With Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965).
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Over the last twenty years, increasing access to records in Japan,
Russia, and the United States has revealed that in the three days following the bombing of Hiroshima Japan’s leaders had little idea that they had
to surrender as a result of the bombings.4 Meeting notes, diary entries,
and the actions that various actors took during this period show that
while Japan’s leaders knew Hiroshima had been destroyed by a nuclear
weapon, they saw this as another problem in an already difficult war,
not a war-ending crisis. The Foreign Minister, Togo Shigenori, actually
suggested convening the Supreme Council two days after the bombing
of Hiroshima to discuss it and found he could not generate enough
interest on the subject to get it on the agenda.
When the Soviet Union, which had signed a five-year neutrality pact
with Japan in 1941, broke that agreement and joined the war at midnight
on 8-9 August, however, it touched off a crisis. Within hours of the news
reaching Tokyo, the Supreme Council met to discuss unconditional surrender. It is clear from all the evidence now available that Japan’s leaders
surrendered because of the Soviet entry into the war and not because of
the nuclear bombings.
There are reasons to doubt the traditional story that the Emperor
was horrified by the bombing of Hiroshima. The documentary evidence
is thin,5 and if the Emperor was so moved, it begs the question: why was
he moved by secondhand reports of a city destroyed in August when
he was not moved by driving through Tokyo and personally witnessing
the devastation of that city in March? Would it not be sensible to expect
that firsthand experience would have a stronger emotional impact than
a secondhand report?6
In some ways, this new conclusion about Hiroshima makes sense. In
order to believe that Hiroshima was the cause of Japan’s surrender, it was
necessary to believe that Japan’s military men didn’t know their business. After all, the destruction of a city at that stage of the war was hardly
militarily decisive. The United States Army Air Force had pounded 66
cities into rubble and ashes that summer using conventional bombs.
4     For new research that first began to question the role of the bomb and to emphasize the role
of the Soviet Union (to a greater or lesser extent), see: John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected
Essays (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993); Robert A. Pape “Why Japan Surrendered,” International
Security 18, mo. 2 (Fall 1993): 154-201; Edward J. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the
Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Sadao Asada, “The Shock of
the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review
67, no. 4 (November 1998): 477-512; Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese
Empire (New York: Random House, 1999); Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan
(New York: HarperCollins, 2000); Forrest E. Morgan, Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial
Japan: Implications for Coercive Diplomacy in the Twenty-first Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); and
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2005). A particularly detailed and useful summary of recent scholarship
that also contains reproductions of many primary source documents, is in William Burr, ed., “The
Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources,” National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162, National Security Archive, August 5, 2005, http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm.
5     At best what we know is that the Emperor sent several messages to his adjutant asking for
more information about the Hiroshima bombing. This could indicate concern and horror. It could
also signal something as unemotional as a desire to understand the strategic capabilities of the
weapon.
6     Especially since after the bombing the streets of Tokyo were filled with the burned bodies of
the more than 100,000 who died in the fires. The toll was so great that it took 14 days to clear all
the bodies from the streets. The Emperor made his tour of the city eight days after the bombing,
so it is possible he not only saw the damage done to the city but saw some of the bodies of those
killed in the attack.
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Why would the loss of two more cities make a difference? It is clear that
the Soviet entry into the war decisively changed the strategic calculus,
while the dropping of atomic bombs, no matter how horrifying, did not.
And the scale of the nuclear bombings was not that different from
the conventional attacks that had been going on all summer long. If we
graph the fatalities in all 68 city attacks that summer, Hiroshima ranks
second after Tokyo (a conventional attack). If we graph the square miles
destroyed, Hiroshima is sixth. If we graph the percentage of the city
destroyed, Hiroshima is 17th. Clearly, the end result of the attacks was
not outside the parameters of previous attacks.
Of course Japan’s leaders, beginning with the Emperor, repeatedly
declared that the atomic bombings were decisive, forcing them to surrender. This makes a certain amount of sense, however. Put yourself in
their shoes. Which would you rather say? “We made strategic mistakes.
The Navy and Army could never cooperate properly on joint missions.
Your government and soldiers let you down.” Or would you rather say,
“The enemy made an amazing scientific breakthrough that no one could
have predicted, they invented a miracle weapon, and that’s why we lost”?
The atomic bomb made the perfect explanation for losing the war.
What does this reconsideration of the historical evidence mean
today? The doctrine and tactics for using nuclear weapons have changed
considerably in the last sixty-eight years. But it is important to remember
that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only field tests of these weapons.
Our belief in the special psychological ability of these weapons to coerce
and deter—which forms the foundation for deterrence theory—is
based almost entirely on this one event.7 We may have overestimated
the ability of these weapons to deter or cow opponents. At any rate,
simple prudence dictates that we undertake a fundamental reevaluation
of nuclear deterrence policy if we are going to rely on these weapons for
our security.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The second important revision to earlier ideas comes in the area of
Cold War crises. Most people believe the evidence of Cold War crises
uniformly demonstrates nuclear deterrence reliably controls violence in
a crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates the point. It is axiomatic that
the crisis and its outcome support the conclusion that nuclear deterrence
works. After all, the Soviets snuck missiles into Cuba, there was a risk
of nuclear war, and then they took them out. This is the way nuclear
deterrence is supposed to work—a leader sees the danger of nuclear war
and pulls back; however, although Khrushchev’s behavior can be seen
as supporting nuclear deterrence theory, Kennedy’s cannot.8

7     One could argue, of course, that our belief in nuclear deterrence is based on the success of ordinary deterrence—deterring people from committing crimes, for example. But ordinary deterrence
fails quite often. There are many murders, even in states with the death penalty. One could argue that
faith in nuclear deterrence comes from success in Cold War crises. But since deterrence occurs in the
head of an adversary this is less than reliable evidence. The best evidence about the psychological
impact of the use of nuclear weapons in wartime is the actual use of nuclear weapons in wartime.
8     Although even Khrushchev’s behavior is not necessarily proof that nuclear deterrence worked.
It could be argued, after all, that Khrushchev withdrew the missiles because he liked the deal he
got: a no invasion pledge for Cuba and a commitment to withdraw theater missiles from Turkey.
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President Kennedy was confronted with a crisis. He knew that if he
blockaded Cuba he would touch off a crisis that could lead to nuclear
war. In the week-long secret discussions that led to his decision, he
and his advisors alluded to the possibility of nuclear war 60 times.9 Yet
despite the danger, Kennedy went ahead, undeterred. How does that
align with nuclear deterrence theory?
Recent scholarship on the crisis, particularly Michael Dobbs’s fascinating book One Minute to Midnight, reveals the Cuban Missile Crisis
came within a hair’s breadth of going nuclear three separate times.10
Nuclear war was averted not by the efficient functioning of nuclear
deterrence, but by chance.
The clearest example comes from a routine air sampling mission
over the North Pole by a U-2 spy plane at the height of the crisis. When
the plane’s navigation malfunctioned and it flew 300 miles into Russia,
Soviet MiGs were scrambled to shoot it down. US fighters in Alaska
were scrambled to escort the U-2 back. This occurred at the height of the
crisis, however, and conventional air-to-air missiles on the US fighters
had been removed and replaced with nuclear air-to-air missiles. The US
fighters had no other armament except nuclear missiles in the event of an
encounter with Soviet fighters. Fortunately, none of them encountered
the other.11
It is clear, however, that Robert Kennedy was right when he later
wrote, “President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no
longer had control over them.”12 President Kennedy took actions that
risked nuclear war (and very nearly led to it). If nuclear deterrence causes
leaders to see the risk of nuclear war and withdraw, how can we explain
Kennedy’s actions?
There are two striking things about this reinterpretation of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. First is the clear failure of nuclear deterrence—a
failure that did not lead to nuclear war, but a failure nonetheless. More
interesting is the fact that historians and policy analysts have tended
to ignore these facts. A review of the Cold War reveals these same two
elements recur again and again in other crises: risky and aggressive
actions are taken despite the danger of nuclear war and a clear tendency
to overlook or explain away the failures.
The conclusion drawn from this new research into Cold War crises
is not that nuclear deterrence does not work. There is no question that
ordinary deterrence works at least some of the time. It is not perfect.
People still commit murder even when severe penalties ought to deter
them; however, it clearly works some of the time. Nuclear deterrence
works at least some of the time. Nuclear war is a scary prospect few
can ignore. What this new scholarship reveals is that the failure rate of
nuclear deterrence is potentially higher than theory admits.

9     See Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the
Cuban Missile Crisis, The Concise Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).
10     Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear
War (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).
11     Ibid., 264.
12     Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Signet
Books, 1968), 70-1.
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Nuclear deterrence has to be perfect, or close to perfect. A catastrophic all-out nuclear war could result from any failure of nuclear
deterrence, so there is little margin for error. One could say for nuclear
deterrence, failure is not an option. Yet these documented cases of
nuclear deterrence failure raise the possibility that we have been far
luckier, and have run far greater risks, than we imagined. If nuclear
deterrence has a high rate of failure, continuing to rely on it for the safety
and security of the United States would seem to guarantee its eventual
catastrophic failure.
One of the great strengths of the military mind is its insistence on
experience-based thinking. In the case of nuclear weapons, there has
historically been plenty of theory, but not as much sensible, pragmatic
thinking. It is time for a little more pragmatic analysis.

